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Abstract 
This article examines the impact of national borders on public discourses, based on a case 
study of the struggle surrounding Turkey’s application to join the European Union (EU). 
Comparing opinions, reasons and interpretation patterns in press commentaries about 
enlarging the EU beyond the Bosphorus, the findings confirm the paramount importance and 
robustness of national cleavages between the German and the French public sphere on the 
one hand, and the British on the other. Whereas Turkish membership was predominantly re-
jected on the continent, the British commentators strongly and almost unanimously sup-
ported Ankara’s request to open doors. These similarities and divergences, I argue, are first 
and foremost the result of, and linked with, competing visions of Europe’s finality, especially 
regarding various constitutional ideas and cultural principles. Against this background, the 
Turkey question was partly exploited as an instrument supporting or repressing different 
conceptions of the European Union’s future. 
Zusammenfassung 
Dieser Beitrag untersucht den Einfluss nationaler Grenzen auf öffentliche Diskurse am Fall 
des Streits um einen eventuellen Beitritt der Türkei zur Europäischen Union (EU). Ein Ver-
gleich der Meinungen, Begründungen und Deutungsmuster in Pressekommentaren zu einer 
EU-Erweiterung jenseits des Bosporus bestätigt die herausragende Bedeutung und Robust-
heit nationaler Konfliktlinien zwischen der deutschen und französischen Öffentlichkeit auf der 
einen Seite und der britischen auf der anderen. Während eine geplante Mitgliedschaft der 
Türkei auf dem Kontinent überwiegend abgelehnt wurde, unterstützten die britischen Kom-
mentatoren den Beitrittswunsch Ankaras nachdrücklich und nahezu einstimmig. Diese Ähn-
lichkeiten und Unterschiede, so meine These, resultieren in erster Linie aus und sind ver-
knüpft mit umstrittenen Visionen zur Finalität Europas, insbesondere mit verschiedenen Ver-
fassungsideen und kulturell-religiösen Grundlagen. Vor diesem Hintergrund wurde die Tür-
keifrage teilweise als ein Instrument missbraucht, um unterschiedliche Zukunftsmodelle der 
EU zu unterstützen oder zurückzudrängen. 
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1. Introduction
1 
 
In the age of transnationalisation and globalisation (see Held et al., 1999; Held, 2000), the 
relevance of national borders seems to be diminishing slowly, but continuously. Certainly, the 
general predication that »Europe today is a Europe without borders« (Berezin and Schain, 
2003: vii) is a sweeping oversimplification and exaggeration, but it refers to a manifest and 
probably irreversible transformation. In particular, the European integration process has led 
to far-reaching changes and to an assimilation of domestic law systems in many policy fields, 
which had been exclusive subjects of national governance since the emergence of the mod-
ern nation-state (see Caporaso et al., 2001; Olsen, 2002; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; 
Jessop, 2004; Leibfried and Zürn, 2005). This »governance beyond the nation-state« (cf. 
Zürn, 2000; Jachtenfuchs, 2001) has entailed multi-faceted deregulations and standardisa-
tions both internally and between EU member states – the launch of the »Euro« and the 
abolishment of border controls in the EU after the »Schengen Agreement« highlight just the 
most prominent and directly noticeable outcomes of these developments. A new polity has 
been created in Europe, and even though state territories will naturally continue to exist in 
the European Union, we should assume in the face of these fundamental shifts that features 
like identity, culture or language repertoires have also become more and more similar in na-
tional societies as a consequence of the increased transnationalisation of communication 
flows and mobility between them. However, most studies show a distinctive robustness and 
resistance of national identities and cultures. Even if first tendencies of change have been 
identified, the majority of the citizens still see themselves as German or French, for example, 
and not primarily as Europeans, and only a few among them can demonstrate a good com-
mand of more than one foreign language (Eatwell, 1997; Herrmann et al., 2004; Bruter, 
2005; Robyn, 2005). 
                                                       
1 This paper presents first results of the project: »Christian Club, Security Fortress, or Free Trade Area? 
Comparing Visions of Europe’s Finality in German, French and British Discourses on Turkey’s Applica-
tion to Join the EU«. I gratefully thank the European University Institute in Florence for providing me 
with the opportunity to realise this project within the framework of a Jean Monnet Fellowship (09/2005-
06/2006) at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, as well as Bernhard Peters and Michael 
Zürn who supported my application. For helpful comments and suggestions, I would like to thank Rai-
ner Hülsse, Markus Jachtenfuchs, James Kaye, Hagen Schulz-Forberg, Bo Stråth, Ruth Wodak and 
Oliver Treib. Furthermore, I want to express my gratitude sincerely to Matthias Walz and to Nicolas 
Sauger, who checked the translations of the French commentaries, and in particular to Corinne Heaven 
and Lisa Hunt for correcting the manuscript. 2 ⎯Wimmel / Beyond the Bosphorus? ⎯ I H S 
 
In contrast, the impact of national borders on opinions, reasons and interpretative patterns in 
public discourses about EU policy issues is still unclear and has not yet been systematically 
analysed. A relatively exhaustive corpus of literature on the normative requirements and 
deficits of a »European public sphere« is available (cf. van de Steeg 2002; Eriksen 2005; Pe-
ters 2005), but these studies do not contribute much to finding out if, and to what extent, na-
tional public discourses differ in the run-up to important EU decisions, and to which factors 
these differences or similarities can be attributed. From an analytical point of view, in this 
comparative study the term »public discourse« denotes argumentative discussions on con-
tentious statements, assertions and justifications in the public sphere, especially represented 
in the mass media as the most important forum for the formation of public opinion. In this 
working paper, I will try to answer two questions: firstly, do national borders have a dominant 
impact on opinions, reasons and interpretation patterns in public discourses about European 
issues, or are the discursive communities more camp-dependent than state-dependent? Do 
we find specific contents and structures in public discourses which can be traced back to the 
respective nation-states in which they are held, or do national borders have no significant 
impact on public discussions dealing with EU policies? A discursive community means dis-
course participants who have the same – or at least similar – opinions, reasons and interpre-
tative patterns in public discourses about a certain issue. If the discursive communities are 
camp-dependent it will not be national borders but instead several social groups (e.g. the 
»conservatives« or the »unions«) who define the transnational ideological memberships, 
provided they represent similar positions and arguments. If the discursive communities are 
state-dependent, first and foremost the nationalities of the discourse participants (Germans, 
French etc.) will define the ideological memberships. Secondly, why do we find, or why do 
we not find, state-dependent cleavages in public discourses about a particular European is-
sue? My main argument is that the impact of national borders on public discourses about 
European issues depends on different visions of Europe’s finality which dominate in national 
societies and were brought into the discourse by the discourse participants either implicitly or 
explicitly. With the term »Europe’s finality«, I mean particular ideas or preferences concern-
ing the final state of the European integration process, following old controversies between a 
politically integrated European federal state (Bundesstaat) and an intergovernmental asso-
ciation of sovereign nation-states (Staatenbund). If a particular model of the European Un-
ion’s future goes hand-in-hand with a certain political decision, we will observe strong public 
support; but if a vision of Europe’s finality conflicts with a certain political decision, public pro-
test and opposition will emerge. 
For a long time it has been recognised that not only state power and national interests play 
an important role in international politics and transnational socialisation processes, but also 
beliefs, rules and norms regarding the legitimacy or morality of political institutions and deci-
sions (see Kratochwil 1989; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Yee 1996). Following these clas-
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sical and well-known works, Thomas Risse has encouraged the scientific community to con-
front European studies with the theoretical knowledge of neighbouring disciplines like »Inter-
national Relations Theory« and »Comparative Policy Analysis« in order to »gain a better un-
derstanding of the role of ideas and principled beliefs in the EU integration process« (Risse-
Kappen 1996: 54). Thereupon, Markus Jachtenfuchs and his colleagues analysed the stabil-
ity and continuity of normative ideas about legitimate political orders for developing the Euro-
polity in German, French and British party programmes over several decades. Their study 
confirms the assumption that these deep-rooted beliefs about an appropriate political organi-
sation in Europe have influenced many political decisions in the Council concerning the con-
figuration of the current multi-level system of governance in the European Union (cf. 
Jachtenfuchs et al. 1998). Shortly afterwards, Martin Marcussen and his collaborators under-
lined the long-neglected identity dimension in European politics by providing evidence for the 
argument that explanations solely based on material, economic or geopolitical interests are 
insufficient to understand national variation in political attitudes towards the »Euro« in Ger-
many, France and Great Britain. Instead, »differences in the construction of collective elite 
identities pertaining to the nation-state and to Europe explain the controversies among the 
political elites in the three countries as well as the variation in attitudes« (Marcussen et al. 
1999: 147). Attention should be drawn to the analytical concept of »discursive nodal points« 
by Thomas Diez, with which he demonstrated through a case study on the British Europe 
debate how much images of Europe influence and control national EU discourses (cf. Diez 
2001). Finally, Ole Wæver and his colleagues designed a discourse analytical framework to 
disentangle the nested relationships of state, nation and Europe in domestic identity con-
structions to provide a valid concept in order to explain and to predict selected policies (see 
Wæver 1998, 2002; Larsen 1999). This paper ties in with these innovative studies by asking 
if, and to what extent, it is possible to explain state-dependent differences and similarities in 
public discourses about particular EU issues by reverting to specific European future visions 
or finality ideas. 
In order to test the impact of European finality visions on public discourses, I selected Ger-
many, France and Great Britain as cases, because in these countries the cleavages on the 
European Union’s future constitution are partially very similar and partially very different. 
Without a clear divergence between the selected countries it would not be possible to pro-
vide evidence for the potential impact of state-dependent future visions. As I will reconstruct 
in the first section of this article, in Germany and France very similar visions on the future of 
the European integration project dominated the public and political discourse. Most of the po-
litical, social and journalistic elites have generally recommended and supported an institu-
tional strengthening and political deepening of the European Union, even though with rather 
different arguments. Provided that the thesis whereby visions of Europe’s finality have an ef-
fect on public discourses about EU issues applies, a comparison of German and French de-4 ⎯Wimmel / Beyond the Bosphorus? ⎯ I H S 
 
bates should show no, or at least only a few, state-specific differences – the cleavages 
should be camp- and not state-dependent. On the other hand, in Great Britain a completely 
different image of Europe has prevailed which assesses the issues of institutional strength-
ening and political deepening of the European Union in a rather sceptical and negative man-
ner. Accordingly, the cleavages between Germany/France and Great Britain should be struc-
tured state- and not camp-dependently. If general visions of Europe’s finality do influence 
public discourses about EU issues, then we will expect to see a distinct difference in this 
second constellation of comparison, which can be traced back to state-specific factors. Fur-
thermore, we should be able to deduce and to document unambiguous evidence on the in-
terrelation between these overriding finality visions and specific European policies from the 
discourse contents. 
All these assumptions will be scrutinised in a comparative case study on the public discourse 
about Turkey’s application to join the EU. The question if, when, and under which circum-
stances the European Union should open its doors to Ankara became a highly contested 
topic in these three EU member states and was commented on intensively at the same time. 
For each of these countries I selected two leading quality newspapers as examination mate-
rial, namely the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) and the Sueddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) for 
Germany, Le Monde (LM) and Le Figaro (LF) for France, as well as The Guardian (GUA) 
and Financial Times London (FTL)
2 for Great Britain. Previous content analyses have shown 
that these newspapers report relatively extensively on European Union policies and provide 
substantial space for opinion-oriented articles in comparison with other types of print media, 
like tabloids or the regional press (see Kevin 2003: 53f). In order to keep the basis of com-
parison constant and to guarantee the reliability of results, for each country one rather con-
servative and/or economic-liberal paper (FAZ, Le Figaro and FTL) as well as one rather pro-
gressive and/or social-liberal paper (SZ, Le Monde and The Guardian) were considered. Re-
liable and meaningful statements concerning the impact of European finality visions on public 
discourses about specific EU issues can only be formulated if the examination material is 
held as equal as possible under all other conditions in each country (ceteris paribus). There-
fore, all editions of these six newspapers published between the 1
st October and the 31
st De-
cember 2002 were surveyed using the online databases Factiva and LexisNexis (search 
                                                       
2 At the beginning, I planned to select the traditional The Times instead of The Financial Times London 
as the second British quality newspaper in addition to the more left-wing The Guardian. But, my own 
preliminary studies had shown that the Turkey question was not discussed in The Times, apart from 
two short commentaries at the day of the Copenhagen summit so that the number of articles would 
have been too small. However, the opinions, reasons and interpretation patterns on Turkish EU acces-
sion in these two The Times comments did not differ from the London edition of The Financial Times. 
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items: Turkey and/or European Union, EU in the respective language). These three months 
are sufficient to capture a self-contained phase of the public debate on Turkey in the run-up 
to the Copenhagen summit on 13-14
 December 2002, since at least in these newspapers no 
further opinion articles were published in the two months before and after. Then, in a second 
content analytical preselection, all opinion articles (leaders, comments and columns) written 
by German, French and British journalists who revealed their opinions in these newspapers 
on the controversial question if, when, or under which circumstances Turkey should become 
a member state of the European Union were chosen from the text sample. 
This article sample was subjected to a qualitative discourse analysis.
3 The theory, episte-
mology and methodology of discourse analyses are still highly contested subjects not only in 
linguistics, but also in »International Relations« and in »European Integration Studies« (see 
Milliken 1999; Holden 2002; Wæver 2004). Nevertheless, many scholars preferring social 
constructivist approaches in political science adopt various types of discourse analysis in or-
der to provide evidence for the role of norms, identities, argumentation, and rhetorical action 
in international or European politics (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Checkel 1999; Risse 
2000; Schimmelfennig 2001; Müller 2004) – sometimes linked with, or embedded in, the 
poststructuralist works of Foucault, Lacan or Derrida (cf. Diez 1999; Howarth and Torfing 
2005). The existence of these multiple approaches is often ascribed to the fact that the cog-
nitive interests in the field of discourse studies are very problem-oriented and diverse so that 
firstly the appropriate method for answering the central research question has to be found. 
On the one hand, this situation leads to several problems, because it is hardly possible to re-
sort to established and reliable standards. On the other hand, a real opportunity is opened 
up to follow innovative research interests and to convert them empirically through the search 
for new methodological paths. Following the practice of »Critical Discourse Analyses« (see 
Wodak 2001; Fairclough 2003; Oberhuber et al. 2005), the text sample of this comparative 
study was examined specifically according to the following three interrelated questions: 
Opinions: To what extent are the opinions of the respective journalists on the Turkey ques-
tion similar or different? Do we find similar cleavages in the quality press of all three national 
public spheres so that the opinion constellation is camp-dependent, or are the cleavages in 
the national public spheres differentially structured in each country? 
                                                       
3 The article sample contains all in all 70 (sometimes very long) opinion articles by 46 different journal-
ists (GER: FAZ 20/10, SZ 11/6; FR: LF 8/5, LM 7/7; GB: FTL 10/7, GUA 14/11); the opinion articles of 
politicians and scientists (and intellectuals) were not included in this study in order to keep the basis of 
comparison in all three countries constant. 6 ⎯Wimmel / Beyond the Bosphorus? ⎯ I H S 
 
Reasons: To what extent are the reasons with which the journalists try to justify their opinions 
similar or different? Do the respective newspapers use the same, or similar, reasons and jus-
tifications cross-nationally (camp-dependent), or are the reasons in the newspapers of each 
country different (state-dependent)?  
Interpretation patterns: To what extent are the interpretation patterns which the journalists of 
the respective newspapers associate with the Turkey question similar or different? In short, 
interpretation patterns relate to the mode how an issue in a public discourse is understood, 
construed or framed, e.g. as a problem, as a risk, or as a chance (cf. Entman 1993). 
In the first section, I reconstruct the dominant national visions on the future of the European 
integration project in Germany, France and Great Britain, which can be derived from the lit-
erature, in order to prove similarities and differences as a confirmation of the case selection. 
The following section starts with a brief reminder of an interview with the former French 
president Valery Giscard d'Estaing, which can be identified as the starting point and initialisa-
tion of the public debate on Turkey in Europe, and which was noted attentively in all three 
countries. Then, I refer and concentrate on the opinions, reasons and interpretation patterns 
on the Turkey question in the six newspapers and demonstrate the paramount importance 
and robustness of national cleavages between the German and the French public sphere on 
the one hand, and the British public sphere on the other hand. Whereas a planned Turkish 
membership was predominantly rejected on the continent, the British commentators strongly 
and almost unanimously supported Ankara’s request to open doors. These similarities and 
divergences, I argue in the final section, are first and foremost the result of, and linked with, 
competing visions of Europe’s finality, especially on various constitutional ideas and cultural 
principles. By showing that the Turkey question was discussed in the shadow of different vi-
sions of Europe’s finality and has been exploited as an instrument supporting or repressing 
different conceptions of the European Union’s future, my previous assumptions on the link-
age between state-dependent visions on Europe’s finality and public discourses about Tur-
key’s application to join the EU can be verified. 
2.  National Visions on Europe’s Finality – A Short 
Reconstruction 
 
In brief, the majority of German political and social elites were, and are still, in favour of sup-
porting and pushing the model of a deeply integrated European Union. The national identity 
has been linked with the idea of Europe as a common peace project: »Since the 1950s, a 
fundamental consensus has emerged among political elites, and has been generally shared 
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by public opinion, that European integration is in Germany’s vital interest« (Marcussen et al. 
1999: 622). Since Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, the Christian Democrats and, after some in-
ternal conflicts, the Social Democrats as the two dominant German parties argued to con-
tinue European unification by endorsing the Maastricht Treaty and the European Monetary 
Union in the 1990s: »The Federal State remains the prevailing concept« (Jachtenfuchs et al. 
1998: 431). They interpreted European integration as a welcome opportunity after the self-
inflicted catastrophe of the Second World War to bind the newly founded Federal Republic to 
the Western state community, hoping to become an enduring and reliable ally (cf. Díez 
Medrano 2003: 179f.). As a result of the continuous transfer of national sovereignty and 
competences to the European level, the German governments purposely weakened and 
curbed state power to demonstrate that they had learned their lessons from their own history 
now: »The tendency is to restrict German self-confidence by the moral scruples of the past 
and therefore cover German national interests under the roof of international alliances and 
particularly of the European Union« (Spohn 2002: 286). The future vision of a European fed-
eral state culminated in the well-known speech of the former German Foreign Minister Jo-
schka Fischer at the Humboldt University of Berlin in 2000 and found its continuation in the 
political support of the European Constitutional Treaty: »However, evidence suggest that de-
spite the end of the Cold War, unification and the coming to power of the red-green govern-
ment, Germany’s European preferences […] have remained pro-integrationist and in many 
aspects similar to those held by previous governments« (Thielemann 2004: 359). Besides 
historical reasons, another driving force behind pushing the integration process was the con-
siderable benefits that Germany’s export-oriented economy gained from the Single Euro-
pean Market and the »Euro« as a common currency (cf. Moravcsik 1998: 478). Furthermore, 
some Germans prefer European integration in order to establish an instrument that could 
fuse the economic and political potentials of the powerful EU member states as a counter-
weight against the United States, Russia or China in the future (see Spohn 2002: 305). All in 
all, there seem to be several reasons that lead to the same objective: a politically integrated 
European Union with wide-ranging competencies for effective problem-solving. 
In France, the question regarding the meaning of Europe also included controversies about 
the French role in world politics since the beginning of European integration: »Europe was 
seen as the centre of the World, and France as the central country in Europe and in Euro-
pean civilization« (Frank 2002: 311). In some French views, the precondition for a strong and 
influential France has to be a strong, influential and institutionally stabilised European Union 
so that the EU Eastern enlargement without prior institutional reforms has already been a 
very contentious issue in the intensive French debate on their national relationships to 
Europe: »France had become too small, and its mission must be taken over by Europe« 
(Wæver 1998: 120). Accordingly, many French people interpret the EU as an instrument for 
acting together with other European states as a (moral) counterbalance against the United 8 ⎯Wimmel / Beyond the Bosphorus? ⎯ I H S 
 
States, able to hold its own alongside its American ally, especially by strengthening the 
Franco-German axis: »A central goal is to establish Europe as a powerful international actor 
with increasing independence from the USA« (Jachtenfuchs et al. 1998: 430). Against this 
background, today’s French political and social elites are generally pro-European after years 
of political struggle among the Gaullist – recalling the »empty chair crisis« in the 1960s – and 
the conflicts in the Socialist Party (see in detail Gueldry 2001: 15f). It was not until the 1980s 
that the French Socialists tried to reconcile French identity with European »we«-
constructions by arguing »that the future of France was to be found in Europe. As Mitterrand 
once put it: ›France is our fatherland, Europe is our future‹« (Marcussen et al. 1999: 621). 
This paradigm shift implies no guarantee for a pro-European line as a basic principle, of 
course, but afterwards it has become more and more difficult to imagine a policy projecting 
an attractive and realistic model for France without implicating European Union politics (see 
Parsons 2000). In connection with German reunification, uncertainties and old fears with re-
spect to national security and sovereignty appeared in the face of a more powerful Germany 
on the other side of the Rhine. But, as after the end of Second World War, French politicians 
again encouraged Germany’s integration by deepening the European Union as a protection 
against the potential danger of a new unilateralism (see Webber 1999). Besides Germany, 
the French government advanced to become a major supporter in the negotiations which led 
to the agreement on the Maastricht Treaty (see Mazzucelli 1997). After the success of the 
Economic and Monetary Union, many French political actors thought that the time had come 
for a »more political, more social, and more democratic Europe« (Jabko 2004: 285). Within 
the Convention on the Future of Europe, the French government thus continued to argue for 
a broad reform of EU institutions that would satisfy its federalist preferences. Having in-
vested so much political effort and diplomacy in the success of a »Constitution for Europe«, 
the negative referendum result in 2005 was a shock for nearly all political and social elites in 
France. 
In contrast to France and Germany, where at least in the elite discourse pro-European vi-
sions and ideas have been, and still are, predominant, public opinion in Great Britain has 
been based on an absolutely different image of Europe: »Whereas the German and French 
debates are centred around the state model, the situation is very different in Britain. The ma-
jorities within both Conservatives and Labour are advocates of the Economic Community, 
and therefore often characterized as ›anti-European‹ by supporters of a Federal State« 
(Jachtenfuchs et al. 1998: 432). The so-called »Euroscepticism« (Forster 2002) on the island 
is still so far-reaching that many Britons even mistrust the affiliation of the United Kingdom to 
Europe and rather speak about »the continent«: »To probe the meaning of the word ›Europe‹ 
in British usage is straightaway to appreciate one of the defining features of Britain’s Euro-
pean debate, namely a profound ambivalence about whether or not Europe includes the 
United Kingdom« (Ludlow 2002: 101). Instead, according to the prevailing perceptions in the 
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literature, the British feel historically, ideologically and politically more strongly connected to 
their most important transatlantic ally, the United States, and counteract all endeavours of the 
EU to establish a political or even a military counterweight against the USA, or to impose a 
»European Constitution« upon them (cf. Kassim 2004). Even the accession to the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, especially the partial relinquishing of parliamentary 
sovereignty, was already exceedingly contested in Great Britain: »The maintenance of com-
mercial, political, and emotional ties to the Commonwealth and the Labour Party’s goal of 
implementing socialist policies were perceived as incompatible with the European frame-
work« (Díez Medrano 2003: 129). Whereas the Liberal Democrats, who have never been a 
part of the British government since the Second World War, are still predominantly in favour 
of European integration (cf. Clarke and Curtice 1998), Labour and the Conservatives as the 
two main parties practised cautious EU politics of »little steps« and with »different veloci-
ties«, as the rejection of the »Euro« has shown (cf. Ludlam 1998).  
If future visions of Europe’s finality really have an impact on national public discourses about 
specific EU issues – in this case the Turkey debate – we can expect that the public opinions, 
reasons and interpretation patterns will be nearly congruent in the German and French dis-
course, whereas we should expect to find clearly marked differences between Germany and 
France on the one hand, and Great Britain on the other. In addition, there should be a no-
ticeable interrelation between these general finality visions and the Turkey question that can 
be derived from the discourse contents and which makes a contribution to the explanation of 
the state-dependent divergences and to the validation of the thesis. 
3.  The Struggle on the EU Membership of Turkey in 
Comparison  
 
The former French President and Chairman of Europe’s constitutional convention, Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing, declared in an interview with the French newspaper Le Monde on No-
vember 9
th 2002 that opening doors to Turkey would mean no less than »the end of the 
European Union«. Turkey might be an important partner that is close to Europe, but due to 
its geographical position as well as its culture and history it is not even a European country 
according to Giscard. In addition to these reasons, which in his opinion should rule out the 
possibility of a Turkish EU membership, he emphasised that in the first instance the forth-
coming accessions of the Central and Eastern European countries must be resolved suc-
cessfully in order to prevent an administrative overstrain of the EU institutions and a financial 
collapse of the EU budget. From a political point of view, one should take into consideration 
that Turkey, with its 66 million inhabitants and its positive demographic development, would 10 ⎯Wimmel / Beyond the Bosphorus? ⎯ I H S 
 
presumably become the most populous EU member state after accession and could dele-
gate more representatives than any other EU country in the European parliament, so that 
Turkey would climb to a powerful veto player in European politics overnight. Giscard 
d'Estaing predicted that if the European Commission begins to bargain with the Turkish gov-
ernment, Morocco will propose a (renewed) application for membership immediately. Fur-
thermore, the former French President accused the supporters of Turkish EU membership of 
thwarting the European integration project and diluting the EU into a free trade area reaching 
as far as the Middle East. All those who were currently pushing for an early entry of Turkey 
were »the true opposers of the European Union«, and not those people like him who were 
warning against an EU membership. The Heads of State and Governments in the European 
Council who had recently stocked new hopes for giving a date to start accession talks with 
Ankara before the summit in Copenhagen, were accessed of being »hypocritical« by Giscard 
d'Estaing: the majority of them would oppose Turkish membership in secret, but nobody 
dares to say it in public. 
Although the European Council wanted to fix a concrete date at which the European Com-
mission should start accession negotiations with Ankara at the summit conference in Copen-
hagen in December 2002, the public debates at the same time were dominated by the more 
fundamental question of whether Turkey, as an Islamic country bordering Iraq and Syria, 
should ever become a member state of the European Union – even if it would, sooner or 
later, accomplish all necessary membership criteria. Thus, in this early phase of the public 
discourse the question if Turkey, as a predominantly non-Christian society and a state terri-
tory which extends beyond the traditional borders of the European continent, should be con-
sidered a member state of the EU in principle was taken up again. According to this focus of 
the public debate, this comparative discourse analysis concentrates on the discussion about 
a general EU membership of Turkey too. In addition, I restrict the following description to the 
two most important and contentious points which were discussed in all three national public 
spheres intensely, in order to reduce the complexity of the paper to an appropriate level and 
to provide for a reliable and significant comparison: 
Widening and deepening conflict: To what extent, and with what kind of arguments, did the 
discourse participants expound the problem that further integration of the EU might be 
thwarted as a consequence of Turkish accession? This part of the debate pertains to the 
questions of whether the political deepening of the EU would be hindered firstly through an 
enlargement of the geographically large and populous Turkey, and secondly, whether this is 
interpreted as being a problem by the discourse participants. 
Culture and identity conflict: To what extent, and with what kind of arguments, did the dis-
course participants expound the problem of the cultural and religious differences between 
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the current EU member states and Turkey? This part of the debate concerns the questions of 
whether Turkey belongs historically and culturally to Europe, and secondly, whether cultural 
and religious differences in general should rule out the possibility of EU membership.
4
3.1  Public Opinion and Turkey Debate in the German Quality Press 
 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
The journalists of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung argued unanimously against an early 
beginning of accession talks, as well as against the EU membership of Turkey in principle. In 
particular the positions and reasons of the »red-green« Federal Government (Social Democ-
rats/Greens), who supported the membership application of Ankara firmly, were criticised ve-
hemently and called into question again and again by the FAZ journalists. In their considera-
tion of the problem of widening versus deepening the EU, as well as regarding the culture 
and identity conflict, they gave Ankara a distinct rejection. 
As a central justification they referred to the, from their point of view, unsolvable conflict be-
tween the attempts of the government to integrate the EU politically more deeply on the one 
hand, and an excessively enlarging and internally differentiated European Community, which 
would be hardly capable of acting, on the other: »The more the EU will extend itself […], the 
looser will be its cohesion, the sharper will be the battles for shares and the weaker will be its 
institutions. That is a political law of nature, which cannot be changed by treaties and consti-
tutional texts« (FAZ, 11 Dec. 2002: 1), as Guenther Nonnenmacher stated. He argued that 
the future of the European integration project would change so fundamentally as a result of 
the EU accession of Turkey that the question of the European Union’s finality should have to 
be posed and discussed anew. The Europeans could not get around of responding to the 
questions regarding the aims, forms and borders of the EU now, which they avoided in the 
past centuries. One could not speak »enthusiastically about a Europe as a ›federation of na-
tion-states‹« or »want to develop ›Europe to a political power‹« and support its expansion in 
all cardinal points at the same time (cf. FAZ, 11 Dec. 2002: 1). Turkish EU membership 
would reduce the primal idea of an »ever closer Union« which was defined in the founding 
era to absurdity, because the affiliation of Turkey would mean a complete different calibre 
than the Eastern enlargement which already confronted the EU with an enormous integration 
challenge. The course would therefore lead away from the plans that Adenauer, de Gaulle 
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and De Gasperi, and later also Mitterrand and Kohl, had once proclaimed for Europe – not-
withstanding all dissensions among them (cf. FAZ, 7 Dec. 2002: 1): »Europe’s politicians 
have fooled themselves and their citizens for a long time that the deepening of integration 
would not afflict with the enlargement of the EU. But that is nonsense. Everybody who sup-
ports the full membership of Turkey […] gives up the aim of a political Union« (FAZ, 14 Dec. 
2002: 1), Berthold Kohler wrote. 
In the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the widening and deepening conflict was often explic-
itly linked with the culture and identity conflict. The unification project, Klaus-Dieter Franken-
berger expressed unmistakably, would not be a matter to which »one adds nation-states ar-
bitrarily without asking for culture and identity« (FAZ, 4 Dec. 2002: 12). Europe would not be 
an »accumulation of nation-states according to geo-strategic calculations or reciprocal eco-
nomical advantages«, Daniel Deckers added, but »a society of nations which have formed 
common values in many centuries and have joined together in freedom, under the impres-
sion of the endangering of these values« (FAZ, 16 Dec. 2002: 1). But that Turkey belongs 
historically and politically to this Europe was doubtful for good reasons. Guenther Nonnen-
macher stated that Turkey would share significantly more similarities with countries like Aus-
tralia, Argentina or the USA, which nobody would ever seriously associate with EU member-
ship, because »their political systems have European roots based on constitutions following 
European examples, the cultural relations to Europe are close [and] a large part of the to-
day’s population has European ancestors« (FAZ, 20 Dec. 2002: 12). The aim of a political 
Union could only be achieved on the foundation of common collective identities and value 
conceptions, therefore Turkey’s membership must also be rejected for cultural-historical rea-
sons: who would seriously want »to make believe a public, which already sees the today’s 
Union […] as being distant from the citizens or even menacing, that a geographically un-
bordered and politically, economically as well as culturally heterogeneous construction can 
remain a supportive community« (FAZ, 11 Dec. 2002: 1)? Against the background of this 
critical opinion concerning Turkish EU accession, it does not seem surprising that the FAZ 
journalists consistently supported Giscard d'Estaings point of view. In their view, the former 
French President had merely expressed openly what was in fact believed in almost all capi-
tals but was not admitted for strategic as well as tactical considerations – that Turkey is not a 
European country, neither geographically nor culturally, and that its membership would hope-
lessly overstrain the European Union: »The affiliation of Turkey would modify the nature of 
the EU«, Berthold Kohler wrote, »this discussion is much more about the EU than about Tur-
key. Giscard reminded the Europeans just once more of it« (FAZ, 9 Nov. 2002: 10). 
 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung 
In obvious contrast to the FAZ, the journalists of the Sueddeutsche Zeitung did not argue in 
both central contentious points against a Turkish membership. Whereas most of the SZ jour-
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nalists recognised the potential widening and deepening conflict and rejected Turkey’s EU 
accession for this reason too, they turned away from culture and identity arguments. Conse-
quently, they declared themselves against Turkish EU membership on the first contentious 
point and in favour on the second contentious point. 
The main argument of the Sueddeutsche Zeitung against Turkey’s accession was, as well as 
in the FAZ, the structural conflict between widening and deepening the EU. Also the majority 
of the SZ journalists placed more weight on a politically integrated and consolidated EU than 
on its rapid territorial enlargement and argued for other forms of cooperation beyond EU 
membership. It would naturally be »the legitimate right of Turkey to press towards Brussels«, 
but it should remain the right of the present EU member state governments to reject an ac-
cession application as well. Provided that they would be convinced Europeans, they would 
not have any other choice according to the spirit of the European project, Stefan Ulrich 
wrote, because an »affiliation of the large, populous, politically and socially differently struc-
tured Turkey with its distinct awareness of sovereignty would continue to weaken the at this 
stage already poor cohesion energies of the EU« (SZ, 13 Nov. 2002: 4). Therefore, Russia or 
Ukraine would be ruled out as potential members too, if the European project »should not di-
lute to a Eurasian regional organisation of the United Nations«. The question of whether Tur-
key could join the EU or not depended on the aim that should be pursued with the European 
integration project. If the EU represented nothing more than an »instrument for the stabilisa-
tion of other nation-states«, nothing would stand in the way of Turkey’s accession; but if one 
aspired to another future vision, it would be feared that this one could not be realised after-
wards: »But, anybody who sees the EU actually as a work as such, as a common destiny of 
relatively homogeneous nation-states, slowly melting together, must fear that the accession 
of Turkey prevents the perfection of this work« (SZ, 6 Dec. 2002: 4), Stefan Ulrich added in 
another commentary. As well as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, most of the SZ journal-
ists also criticised the German Chancellor Schroeder and his foreign minister Fischer for 
their inconsistent intention to solve problems efficiently with the help of the EU instrument 
without at the same time maintaining the chances of political integration. The affiliation of 
Turkey would »destroy those European promises« with which »the government in Berlin 
promotes new EU visions vis-à-vis the voter«. The political elites should take into considera-
tion: »Anyone who misplaces Europe’s Eastern borders to Kurdistan overexpands the EU so 
much that it threatens to collapse internally« (SZ, 13 Dec. 2002: 15). 
However, the arguments against Turkey’s accession directed at culture and identity, put for-
ward by the FAZ, were rejected by the SZ journalists almost unanimously. Even if a Turkish 
EU membership was impossible due to other reasons or was not feasible in the near future, 
cultural and religious differences should not be accepted as counter-arguments. Indeed, 
many citizens agreed with the assertion that Muslim Turkey certainly does not fit into the 
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»the secular, modern EU is actually committed to many values, but not to one exclusive re-
ligion alone«. Democracy, freedom and the unconditional respect for universal human rights 
constituted »the true value limits to Europe« (SZ, 13 Nov. 2002: 4), and not any specific cul-
tural or religious imprints. And these values could be upheld by Christians as well as by Mus-
lims too – or even »dragged in the mud by both groups« (ibid.). Today’s European Union, 
Heribert Prantl noted resolutely, represented a geographically and culturally open future pro-
ject and not the end of European historiography: »Turkey signifies a great chance for the 
European Union«, because it »is a bridge-country, a country between the continents, the 
synthesis of European-Christian and Middle Eastern Islamic culture« (SZ, 18 Nov. 2002: 13). 
The future of the EU did not rest upon a homogeneous culture community according to the 
spirit of a »Christian Club«, but instead upon a secular-democratic community of values to 
which Turkey could also belong in the future. Besides this basic conviction that a culturally 
and religiously pluralistic EU represented a more appropriate model for a modern and cos-
mopolitan Europe than the outdated battle for a Christian-orthodox community construction, 
Matthias Drobiski was arguing pragmatically that Islam had captured its place in Europe for a 
long time – together with its »mosques, doner kebab stands, headscarf and Koran editions«. 
Indeed, we should discuss if »Turkey is politically consolidated and economically strong 
enough« to join the European Union at any point in time. But the belief that one could keep 
Islam away from Europe by refusing Turkey’s membership would be »a fabulous autosug-
gestion« because between 14 and 17 million Muslims already live in Europe: »As long as Is-
lam in Europe fails to become a part of the European culture, there will be no united Europe« 
(SZ, 23 Dec. 2002: 4). 
Summary 
In the German quality press, the Turkey debate was led extraordinarily engaged and com-
pletely overshadowed by general visions on the finality of the EU. Concerning the first central 
point, the widening and deepening conflict, both newspapers argued predominantly against a 
Turkish EU accession, because they took for granted that the realisation of a politically inte-
grated Europe would be aggravated and complicated materially in the future if Turkey joined 
the EU. The journalists of both newspapers agreed widely upon the presumption that enlarg-
ing the EU for the large and economically backward Turkey would be incompatible with the 
ambition of politically deepening and consolidating the EU institutions, and they rejected an 
early Turkey accession for this reason. Regarding the second contentious point, the culture 
and identity conflict, the FAZ and SZ journalists held different, actually opposite, opinions 
and reasons. The Turkey critique in the FAZ was supported by the conviction that a political 
deepening of the European Union would only be possible on the basis of common culture-
historical identities, that Turkey would not belong to a Christian cultural sphere and that its 
accession would run contrary to collective identity formation for this reason. In contrast, the 
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SZ journalists argued against the validity of the culture and identity argument by affirming 
that Europe’s social integration, as a precondition for the political deepening of the EU, did 
not rely on any particular culture or religion, but instead on the respect to the universal prin-
ciples of freedom and human rights. In a nutshell, both newspapers broadly agreed that a 
further political integration of the EU would be a positive ambition, and secondly, that deep-
ening the European unification process could only be realised on the solid basis of a collec-
tive identity. The conflict between both leading quality papers in Germany culminated in the 
question of whether the formation of a collective identity in Europe presupposes common 
cultural-religious principles (FAZ), or if the respect of universally accepted human rights is 
suffice as an identity resource in order to perpetuate the vision of a politically integrated 
European Union (SZ). 
3.2  Public Opinion and Turkey Debate in the French Quality Press 
 
Le Figaro 
Along with the liberal-conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the journalists of Le Fi-
garo also argued against Turkey’s EU membership without exception, and they emphatically 
excoriated the pro-Turkish attitude of their President Jacques Chirac. They stressed the wid-
ening and deepening conflict a few times, but concentrated on defending the culture and 
identity argument against Turkish EU accession, which was brought forward in great detail in 
the face of deteriorating prospects for political integration after enlargement. 
Whereas the FAZ journalists criticised the pro-Turkish policy of the German Federal Gov-
ernment and highlighted the structural widening and deepening conflict, this first central is-
sue played a slightly subordinate role in the commentaries of the LF journalists. Only 
Renaud Girard noted that Turkish EU membership would significantly reduce the capacity of 
EU institutions to integrate and to act in the future. Realising enlargement before the Euro-
pean Union has consolidated itself internally would be a »historical mistake« that could have 
fatal consequences for the institutional Europe, he feared. Eastern enlargement, which was 
highly contested in France, would already »paralyse the EU institutions« enough, but addi-
tionally trying to assimilate Turkey would mean »plain and simple to give the Union the final 
coup de grace« (LF, 27 Nov. 2002: 13). These arguments were supported by the contention 
that Turkish accession would destroy the required cultural-religious identity fundamentals of 
a politically integrated EU. In a very dramatic and accusatory style, the LF journalists tried to 
defend the idea of Christian Europe. Before the European leaders abandoned themselves to 
their blind enlargement enthusiasm even more, Europeans should first agree on who they 
actually are, and determining their commonalities and their collective identity – urgent and 
important questions, even if they »must sound unbearable to the ears of universalists« (LF, 16 ⎯Wimmel / Beyond the Bosphorus? ⎯ I H S 
 
15 Nov. 2002: 13), Ivan Rioufol commented. In this context, the traditional values of the Turk-
ish majority population, which in no way conformed to the secular system of government, 
were identified as longstanding obstacles to EU membership. 
Louis Morel insinuated that the Turks did not respect the fundamental Western value con-
ceptions of freedom and human rights, and particularly the principle of equality between men 
and women, in a way that people in Continental Europe have long internalised. Even if one 
tacitly accepted religious differences in the EU and even though some secular tendencies in 
Turkish society were noticeable, Turkey would still »belong to the Muslim civilisation« (LF, 2 
Nov. 2002: 14), he wrote. The Turks, Louis Morel continued, have not adopted many elemen-
tary Western norms in their personal life-worlds – everyone who has already been in the 
Anatolian hinterland could and should be able to confirm this observation. Large parts of the 
Turkish population have internalised another cultural identity, which could not be reconciled 
with European society, even if one decidedly tried to, and indications for a real departure 
from this were hardly recognisable. Indeed, these notes should not be misunderstood as a 
general rejection of Turkish culture and way of life, but merely highlight that under these cir-
cumstances the Europeans have the right to dismiss Turkey’s application to join the EU. The 
Turks could not be real Europeans, simply because they had not experienced the process of 
enlightenment: »Europe was built on the dual heritage of Christianity and Enlightenment. But 
Turkey was not« (LF, 27 Nov. 2002: 13), Renaud Girard got straight to the heart of the prob-
lem. For the LF journalists, as well as for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the former 
President of the European Convention, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, personified a central point 
of reference – his statements were highlighted affirmatively in almost every critical commen-
tary in Le Figaro. According to Ivan Rioufol, hardly any other statesman had expressed him-
self so courageously in the past and justifiably stressed that »this Muslim country of Asia Mi-
nor definitely does not have its place in the European family, neither culturally nor geo-
graphically« (LF, 15 Nov. 2002: 13). The major argumentation strategy of Le Figaro and FAZ 
consisted not only of the (empirical) assertion that the Turks did not belong to the European 
community of values as a result of their way of life, but also that Turkey’s accession applica-
tion should be rejected in the light of these value based differences. The more popular idea 
of a further political deepening of the European integration process, which still prevails 
among the French political elites, could only be realised within a Christian-western value 
community, for whose strengthening Turkish EU accession would be detrimental. 
Le Monde 
Virtually congruent with the SZ journalists and contrary to Le Figaro, the journalists of Le 
Monde did not fully reject Turkish EU membership in both central points. The conflict be-
tween widening and deepening the EU was also interpreted against Turkish EU accession by 
the majority, because it would make the realisation of the future vision of a socially and politi-
 I H S — Wimmel / Beyond the Bosphorus? — 17 
 
cally integrated European Union almost impossible, whereas the second contentious point, 
the culture and identity argument, was completely revoked and dismissed by the LM journal-
ists. 
Against the background of the continental future vision of a politically deepened European 
Union, the central problems of Turkish EU membership were also deconstructed and brought 
to the point by the journalists of Le Monde several times. Daniel Vernet critically noted that 
the EU has not »adjusted its institutions to enlargement«, neither for ten nor for twelve new 
members, and that the most supporters of enlargement were »the enemies of a powerful 
Europe«, of a Europe that would have the ability to speak with one voice in international poli-
tics and whose function would not be reduced to a free trade area without political relevance 
in the end. In brief, enlarging the EU beyond the Bosphorus was »a synonym for the dilution 
of the European construction and run counter to the project of the founding fathers« (LM, 11 
Nov. 2002: 13). Claire Trean, who had referred to a statement of the then French Foreign 
Minister de Villepin, also expressed scepticism towards his hopeful point of view that both 
Europe as well as Turkey were well prepared for EU membership. Indeed, a mutual opening 
could serve as a valuable sign that, on the one hand, Europe would be in a position to inte-
grate a very large Muslim country, and one the other hand that a Muslim country would be 
able to modernise itself sufficiently in order to bring Turkish society in line with European 
standards. But, as Claire Trean added, they were unfortunately not be ready for this step 
»neither on the one nor on the other side« (LM, 26 Nov. 2002: 17). This was due to the fact 
that Turkey could presumably not cope with the task of implementing the numerous EU di-
rectives and regulations in national law or at least of guaranteeing their compliance on the 
one hand, and that the Union could not absorb the overhasty affiliation of more countries for 
the time being on the other hand. The economic, social and political backwardness of Turkey 
would jeopardise the continuation of the European integration process, Trean predicted, be-
cause the common denominator upon which all representatives of the Council of Ministers 
could agree would become smaller and smaller the more dissimilar EU member states be-
come. 
Even though the journalists of Le Monde unanimously expounded the problems of Turkish 
EU membership due to the widening and deepening conflict, they dismissed the culture and 
identity argument brought in and defended by the FAZ and Figaro journalists almost in an 
identical way with the Sueddeutsche Zeitung. The LM journalists argued that Christian 
Europe and Muslim Turkey did not embody two independent cultural areas, but that the ex-
isting religious differences should have no influence on the question of Turkish membership 
due to the fact that the EU represented a secular project. Instead, they tried to show histori-
cally that the original roots of Christianity and Islam were closely interwoven with each other 
and that the construction of a dichotomy was misleading. In a comparatively detailed analy-
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lee and their diffusion from Asia Minor to Europe. For this reason, cultural-religious differ-
ences should not be misinterpreted as insuperable obstacles for EU membership; the his-
torical sense of belonging to European civilisation was much too deeply-rooted in the Turkish 
society. Finally, it was exactly the »capacity to blend and to aggregate the most differential 
influences«, that »made up the strength of Europe«, as Le Gendre noted (LM, 23 Nov. 2002: 
14). Also Henri de Bresson doubted the correctness of the historical argument by mentioning 
that Turkey had been »a cradle of the Greek civilisation«, before it later became the seat of 
the Ottoman Empire, even if he was sceptical about EU accession of Turkey in other re-
spects (cf. LM, 10 Dec. 2002: VIII). This rejection of the culture and identity argument was – 
similar to the Sueddeutsche Zeitung – supported by the firm belief that the collective com-
munity sub-structures of Europe, as a precondition for a continuation of the political integra-
tion process, should not be founded on one exclusive culture or religion, e.g. Christianity, but 
instead on universalistic norms such as freedom and human rights. As soon as these rights 
were permanently respected by the government in Ankara and were carried through to Turk-
ish society, there would no longer be, in the eyes of the LM journalists, any justification to 
dismiss Turkey’s application to join the EU for cultural-religious reasons. 
Summary  
The struggle over Turkey’s EU accession also temporarily dominated the public discourse in 
France and actually pushed domestic issues intermittently into the background. A compari-
son of the German and the French debates shows that searching for state-dependent differ-
ences is like looking for a needle in a haystack. Concerning the widening and deepening 
conflict, in both countries a relatively broad consensus existed that EU accession of Turkey 
was highly problematic in the light of the ambition to deepen European integration, which 
was favoured by the national elites in both countries, because this next enlargement step 
would presumably reduce the EU’s capacity of problem-solving as well as the institutional 
ability to act, and would substantially complicate consensus-finding in the European Council 
and the European Parliament. This position was held, as we have seen, more or less inten-
sively in both countries by the conservative and/or economic-liberal, as well as by the rather 
progressive and/or social-liberal newspapers. Regarding the workability of the culture and 
identity argument, in both national public spheres a cleavage between the respective news-
papers and between the camps was established. With cultural-religious reservations, the 
FAZ and Figaro journalists additionally fought against Turkish EU membership by arguing 
that collective identity is an essential precondition for a politically integrated Europe which 
could only develop and consolidate itself within the solid framework of Christian-western 
value perceptions. In contrast, the SZ and Le Monde journalists tried to justify the opposite 
position, whereby common collective identity, which they also denoted as an important basis 
for a politically integrated Europe, must not necessarily be supported by a special cultural-
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religious imprint – such as Christianity, for example. More decisive was the political compli-
ance with, and the social acceptance of, universal freedom and human rights, which already 
were, or at least could be, practised successfully in Muslim countries too. Moreover, some 
journalists of Le Monde argued that constructing a gulf between Christianity and Islam was 
historically wrong, because both religions had similar roots; and for this reason they argued 
that Turkey doubtlessly belongs to the »European family«. 
3.3  Public Opinion and Turkey Debate in the British Quality Press 
 
Financial Times London 
Controversial national discourses, which we were able to follow in the German and the 
French public sphere in extenso, did not take place in Great Britain. That Turkey should join 
the European Union sooner rather than later was not controversial in the British quality 
press, nor was it an issue for the most influential British political parties, the Labour and the 
Conservative Party. In both newspapers, the widening and deepening conflict was not inter-
preted against an EU accession of Turkey or even construed as a problem, and the British 
did not accept the (unchallenged) cultural-religious differences as a legitimate obstacle for 
EU membership. 
The strained relationship between widening and deepening the EU expounded vehemently 
in Germany and also in France were not really understood as a conflict by the FTL journal-
ists. Amongst others, Quentin Peel picked up this interpretation pattern and reflected the 
fears of many continental Europeans that one could maybe affiliate Turkey into a free trade 
area without concerns, but not into a community which aspires to political integration: »The 
[argument] is that Turkey is too big – it will soon have a larger population than Germany – 
and too economically backward to be accommodated« (FTL, 13 Nov. 2002: 21). His re-
sponse towards this continental objection was remarkable: after the forthcoming Eastern 
enlargement, the future vision of an ever closer federation, which some idealists in Europe 
were obviously still dreaming of, could not be realised anyway, because an EU with 25 
member states could no longer develop the same unifying force as the good old »club of 15« 
in the past. Therefore, Turkish accession would not overstrain the EU institutionally. Quite the 
contrary, Peel added, since the affiliation of further countries, like Turkey, would in fact be-
come much easier as a consequence of the extension to the East: »The enlargement of the 
EU is going to transform the nature of the bloc. The new member states to be admitted at the 
Copenhagen summit next month may not be as big as Turkey, but they are closer to it eco-
nomically. A 25-member EU will be more fluid and varied than the present club of 15. New 
members should become easier to absorb« (ibid.). For that reason, the threatening costs of 
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many: all involved parties, in particular the new member states, should accept as early as 
possible that there will definitely be no second Greece or Spain, which have significantly 
benefited from the opening of the European Single Market and the EC Structural Funds, in a 
European Union expanded to the former Eastern Bloc. In the course of Eastern enlargement, 
the European integration process would be automatically stopped and must go into reverse – 
a »cash cow« for the Turks as a welcome present could realistically not be demanded then, 
Peel asserted. 
Contrary to what one could perhaps have expected, the Turkey issue was not initially re-
garded from an economic point of view in the Financial Times London. Instead, the FTL jour-
nalists polemicised against the interpretation of Europe as an exclusive »Christian Club«, 
which many other British commentators associated with continental critique of Turkey’s ac-
cession. The belief, that the EU was, and should remain, a »Christian Club« would »amount 
to dangerous nostalgia«, because »Europe's values of democratic government and respect 
for the rule of law may have emerged from Christian civilisation, but they have evolved«. To 
insist on their Christian content would »encourage precisely the sort of discrimination that 
European values are supposed to prevent. The continent is now irretrievably multicultural, 
and the better for it« (FTL, 13 Nov. 2002: 21). In particular this central idea of the insistence 
on a particular religion as a necessary condition to join the EU strictly contradicted those val-
ues which the European Union wants to protect according to the European Charter of Hu-
man Rights – namely religious and cultural self-determination and tolerance – was de-
nounced by the British press again and again. It seems simply inconsistent and unfair to 
preach religious and cultural neutrality on the one hand, and to refuse all those countries the 
entrance tickets whose population is predominantly Muslim on the other hand. The question, 
whether the Turks in fact accepted Western values and norms satisfactorily within their own 
society, as was frequently doubted especially in the French discourse, was quite irrelevant 
for the FTL journalists. As a reflection of their »Eurovisions«, the criteria regarding collective 
identity did not play a decisive role, since transnational common feelings would not have to 
be developed inside an intergovernmental free trade area which is characterised by a low in-
tegration level so that the cultural-religious differences between most EU member states and 
Turkey were in no way interpreted as serious obstacles to accession. According to this atti-
tude, the public reactions towards the Giscard d'Estaing interview were consistently marked 
by rejection and protest in both British newspapers, first of all in the comment by Philip 
Stephens: »Some, like Valery Giscard d'Estaing, […] further insist that the only permissible 
definition of Europe is its Christian heritage. The admission into the EU of Turkey, he says, 
would mark the ›end of Europe‹. The Islamists (or would he say the barbarians?) must be 
stopped at the gates. Such are the ugly prejudices of the ancient regime. They are also pro-
foundly stupid« (FTL, 6 Dec. 2002: 23). 
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The Guardian 
In The Guardian, the Turkey question produced some more and detailed commentaries than 
in the Financial Times London. The Guardian journalists also vociferously supported the EU 
ambitions of Ankara; consequently, it was not possible to uncover a national cleavage in the 
Turkey debate, despite the different political orientations of both newspapers in other re-
spects. As well as in the FTL, the widening and deepening conflict was not interpreted as a 
problem, and culture and identity arguments against the EU accession of Turkey were also 
strongly rejected by the Guardian journalists. 
The Guardian’s central argument in favour of beginning accession negotiations and for Turk-
ish EU membership in general rested on the strong belief that EU accession would consoli-
date and strengthen the democratic reform process in Turkey as it has done in other formerly 
autocratic states like Spain for example. The prospect of EU membership in the near future, 
Jonathan Steele supposed, would significantly encourage secular modernisers on-site, since 
no other international organisation in Europe had been as successful and effective in the 
past with the implementation, monitoring and support of democratic structures as the EU. 
The »rigorous membership criteria are having an effect in getting countries in eastern and 
central Europe with authoritarian traditions to start implementing the concepts of individual 
human rights, rule of law, and democratic governance. The EU should take Turkey in now« 
(GUA, 12 Dec. 2002: 22). Following up typical security-related arguments, and in absolute 
opposition to all opponents of Turkish membership in the German and French newspapers, 
Chris Alden interpreted the territorial size and the rapid population growth not as a substan-
tial structural disadvantage, but instead as the greatest advantage for Turkey’s application for 
the Western world which nobody on the continent wanted to take notice of seriously: »The 
most obvious strengths to Turkey's case are its size, strategic position and powerful military« 
(GUA, 12 Dec. 2002: 18). From a classical »realist« point of view, which was taken up by 
many British journalists who were unable or reluctant to see much more in the European Un-
ion than a European NATO, Europe’s power and sphere of influence could be reinforced and 
extended up to Iraq, he argued without hesitation: »This would also be beneficial to the US 
and Britain, because Turkey has bases not far from its border with Iraq« (ibid.). The conflicts 
between widening and deepening the EU expressed almost ad nauseam by the FAZ journal-
ists were not even perceived as a problem in passing by the Guardian journalists, so incom-
prehensible was the ambition of a deepened political integration to them. 
However, the interpretation pattern of overriding importance for the Guardian journalists was 
the strict rejection of the so called »Christian Club«, which – according to the conservative 
camps in the German and French discourses – should be closed for Turkey due to the al-
leged cultural-religious differences. In the face of the historical decisions in the course of the 
Eastern enlargement, the impending EU summit in Copenhagen would provide an excellent 
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Turks are a part of Europe and unambiguously belong »to us«. The European Union was 
perceived to be at the crossroads, since with a renewed deferral to Ankara the shortcomings 
of the European integration project would almost irreversibly become apparent. The early 
ideal of a liberal and in some ways transnational community, without special cultural and reli-
gious borders, could no longer be believable or seen as realistic: »A Turkish rebuff at the 
very moment of the largest-ever enlargement could be a defining choice. Europe as an ideal, 
as an inclusive, cooperative project and as an economic and legal entity would have discov-
ered its limits – and its limitations« (GUA, 6 Dec. 2002: 25). In a much elaborated opinion ar-
ticle, the columnist Simon Tisdall was quite astonished, too, why so many Europeans evi-
dently did not want to come to the decision to marry »the intrigued, fascinated, but a bit 
frightened young girl« named Turkey, with whom the changing governments of the EU mem-
ber states have openly flirted for forty years. In addition to many other British journalists, and 
without taking a critical look at their numerous counter-arguments, Tisdall alleged that the 
main reasons for the continental opposition towards Turkish EU accession »boils down to 
prejudice – racial, ethnic, historical and yes, perhaps, religious«, although the Europeans 
would knew exactly how »unacceptable, unjustifiable and ugly« that was. For this reason, 
the EU should »open its arms to the Turks and seize the grand bargain« as soon as possible 
(cf. GUA, 21 Nov. 2002: 24). Valery Giscard d'Estaing, whose statements were otherwise, 
like already in the Financial Times London, rejected by all Guardian journalists, gained popu-
larity at least for his courage to have said aloud what many Heads of State and Government 
were muttering behind their hands for years – namely that they never wanted Turkey to be-
come a member of the EU due to cultural-religious reservations. Behind their fine words, 
there was thus not much more than »the dross of hypocrisy« (GUA, 11 Nov. 2002: 17), as 
Peter Preston claimed in a typically British style in his column. 
Summary 
Notwithstanding its lack of controversiality, the Turkey question has led to formations of pub-
lic opinion in Great Britain, too – even if the British debate did not reach the same intensity 
as the German or French debates. As a matter of fact, all British journalists, who gave their 
opinion on the Turkey question in the selected newspapers, supported either the immediate 
start of accession talks or were generally in favour that Turkey should join the European Un-
ion sooner or later. The FTL and Guardian journalists argued unanimously against the idea 
of a culturally and religious predefined and exclusive Europe, which tries to defend itself 
against multicultural influences, and instead called for a culturally and religiously neutral 
Europe which should only be bound to the rights of individual self-determination, including 
cultural and religious freedom. In this context, and from the perspective of the British image 
of Europe, they stated explicitly that the development of a transnational collective identity 
was not a necessary precondition for the functioning of an economic community. Against this 
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background, potential conflicts between widening and deepening the EU identified by the 
German and French journalists were not perceived as a problem in the British quality press. 
The British journalists simply declared that the vision of a politically more closely integrated 
European Union had already been lost its credibility after the decision to accept Eastern 
enlargement – therefore, the accession of Turkey could be managed in a much better way 
today than in the past. The potentially high costs of Turkish membership were qualified and 
played down with a similar argument. Since the British journalists preferred the future model 
of a European free trade area, and due to the very different productivity levels between the 
national economies after the Eastern enlargement, the redistributive EU subsidies and struc-
tural funds should be reduced as much as possible in the future so that Turkey’s accession 
would carry a smaller financial burden. 
4.  The Turkey Question in the Shadow of Europe’s Finality 
 
Firstly, to what extent did national borders have a dominating impact on opinions, reasons 
and interpretation patterns in the case of the public debate about Turkey’s application to join 
the EU in national quality papers? Was it really possible to trace certain discourse contents 
and structures back to the respective national public spheres in which the discourse took 
place, or did national borders barely have any significant influences on the pan-European 
debate over Turkey’s eventual EU membership? Or, to put it more succinctly, were the public 
discourses in the national quality papers structured camp-dependently or state-dependently? 
 
Table 1: Cleavages in German, French and British Discourses on Turkey’s EU Accession 
Country Germany  France  Great  Britain 
Newspaper  FAZ  SZ  Le Figaro  Le Monde  FTL  Guardian 
Widening/Deepening  –  – – –  – – +  + + 
Culture/Identity  – –  + +  – –  + +  + +  + + 
Legend: + + = unanimously pro Turkey’s EU accession; + = majority pro Turkey’s EU accession;                   
– – = unanimously contra Turkey’s EU accession; – = majority contra Turkey’s EU accession 
Table 1 summarises the central results of the qualitative discourse analysis. In the two lines 
at the top, the six newspapers from the three selected countries Germany, France and Great 
Britain can be found. In the two lines below, their respective positions to the widening and 
deepening conflict and to the culture and identity conflict are listed. Two plus signs (+ +) de-
note that the journalists argued unanimously for a membership of Turkey regarding the re-24 ⎯Wimmel / Beyond the Bosphorus? ⎯ I H S 
 
spective contentious point, whereas one plus sign (+) was inserted if at least the majority 
were in favour of Turkish accession to the EU. In contrast, two minus signs (– –) signify that 
the journalists argued unanimously against Turkey concerning the respective contentious 
point, whereas one minus sign (–) symbolises that the majority were against Turkey’s acces-
sion. The justifications for these positions were described, expounded and quoted in detail in 
the content analysis of the commentaries of the six newspapers. 
The table shows the confrontation of the same discursive communities, or camps, in the 
German as well as in the French discourse so that in this first case of comparison – as sug-
gested at the beginning – no state-dependent, but rather camp-dependent cleavages were 
observable, even if the arguments and interpretation patterns of the respective national 
newspapers representing a similar political orientation differed slightly. In both conservative 
and/or economic-liberal papers (FAZ and Le Figaro), the accession of Turkey to the EU was 
categorically rejected with the widening and deepening argument and with the culture and 
identity argument – therefore, it was not surprising that Giscard d'Estaing received broad 
support from the journalists of both newspapers. Also the journalists of the rather progressive 
and/or social-liberal papers (SZ and Le Monde) were predominately against EU accession of 
Turkey and argued like the FAZ and Figaro journalists with the potential widening and deep-
ening conflict, but without bringing forward the culture and identity argument against mem-
bership, from which the SZ and Le Monde journalists explicitly dissociated and distanced 
themselves. Thus, the Turkey debate in the German and French quality press was not char-
acterised by state-dependent cleavages, because in both public spheres almost the same 
camps commented on the Turkey question with very similar reasons and interpretative pat-
terns. In contrast, the comparison between the German-French discourse and the British 
discourse revealed some significant state-dependent differences. Independent from their po-
litical orientations, all journalists of both British newspapers declared themselves as Turkey 
supporters by vehemently rejecting the culture and identity argument (like the rather left-wing 
papers Sueddeutsche Zeitung and Le Monde). At the same time, however, they rarely ex-
pounded the widening and deepening conflict as a problem, but tried to interpret it more 
positively in favour of Turkish EU accession – such a constellation of opinions towards the 
main contentious issues never occurred in the newspapers of the other national public 
spheres and therefore marks a significant state-dependent feature. According to this public 
opinion, and in absolute contrast to most journalists taking part in the German or French dis-
course, the statements of Giscard d'Estaing were disapproved emphatically and almost 
unanimously. 
The question if, and to what extent, national borders have an impact on public discourses 
about EU policy issues obviously depends remarkably on the countries and their national 
public spheres which are compared with each other. The central thesis of this article as-
sumed that the impact of national borders on public discourses about EU issues, such as the 
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Turkey debate, depends on different and contested visions on Europe’s finality, which have 
been consolidated in the national societies and dominate the current national discourses 
about the EU until now. In fact, the comparative content analysis of the national Turkey de-
bates in German, French and British quality newspapers confirmed this presumed interrela-
tion without doubt. The German and the French discourses were overshadowed by the ap-
proach of a politically integrated Federal state (Bundesstaat) which explicitly or implicitly un-
derlay the specific debate on Turkey’s EU accession in both public spheres. Concerning the 
first contentious point, the widening and deepening conflict, almost all German and French 
journalists of both newspapers argued against Turkish accession because they feared that 
EU membership would preclude, or at least complicate, the political deepening of the Euro-
pean integration project due to Turkey’s large territory and its economic backwardness. Addi-
tionally, a broad consensus existed in the newspapers of both countries that the aspired po-
litical integration would presuppose the formation and consolidation of a common collective 
identity of all Europeans, but the necessary conditions of such a transnational identity con-
struction were very controversial in the German and French newspapers. The conservative 
and/or economic-liberal oriented papers (FAZ and Le Figaro) argued that only common cul-
ture-historical imprints and the profession of a certain religion, namely Christianity, could 
successfully work as collective identity substructures for Europe. Since Turkey, as an Islam 
dominated country, does not fulfil these preconditions, EU membership should additionally 
be rejected because of cultural-religious diversity. In contrast, the more progressive and/or 
social-liberal papers (SZ and Le Monde) argued that collective identity formation did not de-
pend on the shared fundamental of one specific culture or religion, but that a common belief 
in the norms of universal freedom and human rights, which could also be accepted in a 
modern and secular Turkey, would provide a sufficient and solid basis for a collective Euro-
pean identity. Therefore, the SZ and Le Monde journalists at least dismissed culture and 
identity arguments against Turkey’s EU accession, even when they were in opposition to 
membership in other respects. Controversies about Europe’s finality and about its presumed 
cultural-religious principles, which have been dominating German and French EU discourses 
until now, were the crucial factor for opinion formation regarding the Turkey question in the 
print media. 
This argument gained additional empirical validity through the comparison with the British 
Turkey debate, in which the usually as eurosceptic characterised journalists of both newspa-
pers intensively promoted and pushed forward Turkey’s perspectives to join the EU. This 
public support, as well as the fundamental opinion and interpretation differences concerning 
the Turkey question between the German/French and the British quality press, can only be 
understood against the background of the dominant vision of Europe’s finality in Britain. The 
British image of Europe is still completely in line with the idea of an association of sovereign 
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fields. This contrasts sharply with the continental vision of a European federal state. Turkish 
EU membership thus fits perfectly into their construction of Europe. Consequently, the struc-
tural conflict between widening and deepening the EU was not interpreted as a conflict, and 
therefore as a problem, by the British journalists because the option of continuing the Euro-
pean integration project was not viewed as a positive aim. Furthermore, if one bears in mind 
that the realisation of a politically integrated and institutionally consolidated European Union 
– as supported by almost all German and French journalists – would be materially compli-
cated through Turkey’s EU accession according to the predominating opinion, then one 
piece of the puzzle fits neatly to the other. In fact, the pan-European debate on Turkey’s ap-
plication to join the EU was a welcome instrument for the British journalists to demonstrate 
the limited feasibility of continental »Eurovisions« and to bury the »old-European« idea of a 
federal state once and for all, if their support for Turkish membership should finally be suc-
cessful. On the other hand, they used the culture and identity arguments against Turkey’s 
accession, which were extensively emphasised in the two conservative newspapers (FAZ 
and Le Figaro), as a stepping stone to protest against the suspected image of a »Christian 
Club«. Beside the belief that a multicultural Europe would constitute a more contemporary 
future model than a backward »Christian Club«, this protest also conceals a strategy to drive 
forward the favoured finality vision by promoting more cultural-religious diversity in Europe. If 
the assumptions of the FAZ and Le Figaro journalists were applicable, whereby deeper po-
litical integration of the EU would be only possible on the basis of common cultural-historic 
experiences and imprints in the long run, membership of the Islamic Turkey could, as a mat-
ter of fact, prevent the implementation of continental »Eurovisions«. 
Actually, this motive was sometimes explicitly assigned to the British in the German and 
French discourse. In the German discourse, Christian Wernicke accused the Labour gov-
ernment and the Conservatives of propagating »the Europeanisation of Turkey with the ulte-
rior motive of decreasing the demand of each integration on the level of a better free trade 
area called European Single Market« (SZ, 13 Dec. 2002: 15). And in the French discourse, 
Renaud Girard suggested that the British campaigned for Turkey’s accession particularly be-
cause »they have always dreamed of an extended free trade area which could preserve their 
sovereignty, as well as their indispensable role as a pivotal point in transatlantic relations at 
same time« (LF, 27 Nov. 2002: 13). This leads to the following conclusion: the opinions, rea-
sons and interpretation patterns concerning the Turkey question in German, French and Brit-
ish quality newspapers can primarily be traced back to future visions or ideas on the finality 
of the European Union, which dominate in the respective national societies. In the future, fur-
ther case studies on other national public spheres and other EU policy debates have to show 
if, and to what extent, this theory on the impact of European finality visions can be verified 
and confirmed. 
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